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ABSTRACT 
This chapter describes an approach to develop an improved metric for network effectiveness through the 
use of Cares' (2005) Information Age Combat Model (/ACM) as a context for combat ( or competition) 
between networked forces. The /ACM highlights the inadequacy of commonly used quantifiable metrics 
with regards to comparing networks that differ only by the placement of a few links. An agent-based 
simulation is used to investigate the potential value of the Perron-Frobenius Eigenvalue ().PFE) as an 
indicator of network effectiveness. The results validate this assumption. Another measurement is proven 
to be equally important, namely the robustness of a configuration. Potential applications from the domain 
of ballistic missile defense are included to show operational relevance. 
INTRODUCTION 
The application of network theory enables us to 
investigate alternatives to the traditional hierarchi-
cal organizations of Command and Control (C2) 
processes and systems. Traditional hierarchical 
organizations were the result of centralized com-
mand and control cultures and the significant 
DOI: I 0.4018/978-1-4666-6058-8.chOO& 
costs, both in time and money, of distributing the 
necessary information to enable sound decision-
making. The increased desire for peer-to-peer 
negotiation and self-synchronization and the 
incredible reduction in these costs during the past 
decade has made non-hierarchical organizations 
viable alternatives. It also introduced a significant 
Copynghl ID 2014, !GI Gluhal Copying or d1stnhu1mg in prin t or electronic fur~ wi1hou1 wriucn pcrmhSton of IGI Glo!>&l 1s proh,hitcd. 
Improving C2 Effectiveness Based on Robust Connectivity 
challenge: what should we measure to determine 
which organization can be more effective? 
The effectiveness of a C2 network is more 
than just the sum of its nodes and arcs, which 
can be measured by the link-to-node ratio (l/N). 
A maximally-connected network, where every 
node is connected to every other node (i.e., l = 
(N-1 )!), not only remains prohibitive io monetary 
cost; it is undesirable due to the inability of a 
node to manage or process the overwhelming 
information flow represented by the arcs. How-
ever, a minimally-connected network may not be 
desirable due to either insufficient capability or 
capacity or an increased vulnerability of the net-
work. Additionally, the link-to-node ratio metric 
cannot discriminate between alternative network 
organizations that have the same numbers of nodes 
and links, but differ solely in their arrangement. 
The mere counting of a link does not account for 
its significance, or lack thereof. 
The degree distribution metric is a measure-
ment of whether the number of links connected 
to each node is uniformly distributed throughout 
a network. Adaptive, complex networks have a 
small number of highly connected nodes (i.e., 
a skewed degree distribution). Such highly con-
nected nodes can be clustered together or can be 
distanced from each other, and is expressed as a 
clustering coefficient calculated from the pro-
portion of a node's direct neighbors that are also 
direct neighbors of each other. This represents a 
measurement of a network's cohesion and self-
synchronization. The characteristic path length 
is a related metric, and is measured as the median 
of the mean of the lengths of all the shortest paths 
in the network. While these metrics begin to ac-
count for link significance, they are insufficient 
indiscriminating between networkconfigurations 
that vary in the placement of just a single link. 
Jain and Krishna (2002) introduced the rela-
tionship between the Perron-Frobenius Eigenvalue 
(1,,PFE) of a graph and its autocatalytic sets, and used 
graph topology to study various network dynam-
ics. Cares (2005) employed a similar approach 
to describe combat (or competition) between 
distributed, networked forces or organizations. 
His Information Age Combat M odel (IACM) 
focused on the "-PFE as a measure of the ability 
of a network to produce combat power. Cares 
proposed that the greater the value of the "i>FE' 
the greater the effectiveness of the organization 
of that networked force. 
Deller, et al (2009, 2012) confirmed this pro-
posal by constructing an agent-based simulation 
that enabled networked organizations to compete 
against each other in the context of Cares' IACM. 
The results of the agent-based simulation indi-
cated that the value of the APFE was a significant 
measurement of the performance of a networked 
force. However, the effectiveness of the "-P£·E 
measurement was dependent on the existence of 
unique "-PFE values for the configurations under 
consideration. When alternative organizations 
had a shared "rr-E value, additional measurements 
were required to enable discrimination. Of the 
additional metrics considered, robustness proved 
the most effective io improving the value of the 
APFE as a quantifiable metric of network perfor-
mance. Ultimately, the best indicator of network 
effectiveness was a metric that combined both the 
\FE and robustness values. 
THE INFORMATION AGE 
COMBAT MODEL 
Cares designed the lACM to facilitate his investi-
gation into bow a networked force organizes. It is 
not intended to be a combat simulation or a tool to 
test weapon platforms. Instead, the basic objects of 
the IACM are generic nodes defined by the simple 
functions they perform, not by any performance 
specifications they were built or designed to. For 
example, Sensor nodes receive signals about ob-
servable phenomena of other nodes in the model. 
The types of signals received are not relevant;just 
that the Sensor"sensed" something about that node 
and passed that information on to a Decider node. 
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Decider nodes direct the actions of other nodes in 
the model. Likewise, the types of actions are not 
relevant;just that those othernodes take direction 
from that particular Decider (i.e., fall within that 
Decider's "command and control"). Nodes that 
interact with otber nodes to affect the state of those 
nodes are called Influencer~. Again, the types of 
interactions are not relevant, just that tbey may 
occur. Finally, those nodes that can be acted upon, 
but perform no sensing, deciding, or influencing 
functions are included as Target nodes. For the 
purpose of this discussion, all nodes belong to 
one of two opposing sides, conventionally termed 
BLUE and RED. 
The links that connect these nodes represent the 
various physical and communicative interactions 
between them. Since these nodes perform a single 
function (e.g., "sense, "direct." etc.), information 
flow between the nodes is necessary for activity 
to occur, and generally takes the form ofa combat 
cycle (see PigureFigure 1 ). In its simplest form, this 
cycle consists of a Sensor detecting an opposing 
node and passing that information co the Sensor's 
controlling Decider. The Decider may then direct 
one of its assigned Influencers to initiate action 
on the opposing node, such as exerting physical 
force, psychological or social influence, or some 
other form of influence. The effect of this action 
is subsequently detected by the Sensor and the 
cycle may be repeated until the desired outcome 
has been achieved. While the four links forming 
this cycle are just a small subset of the all the pos-
sible node-to-node permutations, they collectively 
represent the most important activity in the model 
and are the focus of this study. 
AU links in the model are directional, and have 
different meanings depending on which nodes 
they go "from" and "to". For example, a link 
from a Decider to any friendly node (whether it 
be a Sensor, Influencer, Target or other Decider) 
represents the conveyance of the Decider's direc-
tion (such as engagement or repositioning), but 
the links from an opposing Sensor and Influencer 
represent the Decider being detected and acted 
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Figure 1. Basic combat cycle 
upon. Some links have two meanings, such as 
those from an Influencer to an opposing Sensor. 
These links represent two different interactions: 
detection and engagement. Both interpretations 
are valid and the context of the model will make 
clear which is intended. 
Other links have ambiguous meanings, such as 
those connecting Sensors of the same side. These 
can be defined as either the Sensors detecting each 
other or coordinating with each other. Links from 
a Sensor to other Sensors, Influencers, or Targets 
of the same side can be defined direct coordina-
tion but are not included in this discussion as it 
is assumed that the information detected must be 
routed through a friendly Decider. Additionally, 
links from an Influencer to other nodes of the same 
side represent fratricide and are notincluded either. 
A collection of nodes and links can be de-
scribed though the application of graph theory 
(Chartrand, 1984). A concise description of any 
graph is provided by the adjacency matrix A, in 
which the row and column indices represent the 
nodes, and the matrix elements are either one or 
zero according to the rule: A.= 1 if there exists a 
JJ ' 
link from node i to node j and A,i = 0, otherwise. 
Consequent! y, each unique network configuration 
of nodes and links has a unique mathematically-
equivalent matrix portrayal. This enables the ap-
plication of mathematical tools to analyze these 
networks, such as the Perron-Frobenius theorem. 
This theorem guarantees the existence of a real, 
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positive principal (maximum) eigenvalue of A . 
y 
if A is an irreducible nonnegative matrix. Since 
Q 
all the nodes on each side are connected to all the 
opposing Sensor and Influencer nodes, the matrix 
is strongly connected and, therefore, irreducible. 
This eigenvalue, 11.PFE' is a measure of the selective 
connectivity within the network (i.e., networks 
with the same number of links may have differ-
ent \FE values depending on the placement of the 
links). The full range of mathematical values for 
a 11,rFE of any adjacency matrix goes from 0 (for 
a network with no links at all) to n, where n = 
the total number of nodes (for a maximally con-
nected network). Clearly, the 11,PFE is a quantifiable 
metric with which to measure the different ways 
to organize a networked force. 
The 11.PFE is a !so an indicator of the effectiveness 
of that network's organization. This was deter-
mined through the construction of an agent-based 
simulation representing the IACM and the conduct 
of a series of force-on-force engagements to inves-
tigate the correlation of each opposing network's 
¾FE value with its corresponding probability of 
winning the engagement (Deller, etal, 2012). The 
opposing forces had equal assets and capabilities, 
but differed in their connectivity arrangements 
(i.e., where the links existed). These differences 
in connectivity often, but not necessarily, lead to 
unequal 11,PFE values. 
The consideration of different ¾FE values for 
the opposing forces reflects the first challenge 
in modeling the IACM. The IACM as originally 
described by Cares (2005) uses a single adjacency 
matrix to reflect the collective nodes and links of 
both BLUE and RED forces. This is sufficient 
when focusing on one side's organizational ef-
fectiveness while holding the other side constant. 
But BLUE and RED are each seeking separately to 
maximize their own organizational effectiveness, 
while at the same time minimizing the organiza-
tional effectiveness of the opposing force. This 
dynamic interaction cannot be accounted for with 
a single 11.rFE value, so we calculate separate values 
(A8LuE and ¾ED) to measure the potential effective-
ness of each opposing configuration independent 
of the asset arrangement of the opposing force. 
Note, however, that these calculations required 
the adjacency matrices include a Target node 
to enable the complete depiction of any combat 
cycles the network configurations may contain. 
Any Target nodes included will be linked to all 
opposing Sensors (to enable potential detection) 
and Influencers (to enable potential action). While 
the number of Target nodes included affects the 
¾FE value, it does so because of the additional 
volume of nodes and Jinks, not because of a dif-
ference in their configuration. Consequently, the 
use of a single Target node representative of all 
the enemy forces capable of being targeted can 
be assumed in order to focus on the aspect of the 
network that determines the 11,PFE: value ordering. 
The agent-based paradigm was utilized for this 
purpose because the resulting models provide both 
the ability to account for small unit organization 
and the autonomy of action that was necessary 
for our investigation. An additional advantage of 
utilizing an agent-based simulation was the ability 
to work around the ambiguities of link interpreta-
tion in the IACM described earlier. For details on 
the construct of the agent-based simulation see 
Deller, et al (2012). 
The design of this experiment was intended 
to isolate the effect of the 11,PFE value by keeping 
as many variables between the forces as equal or 
constant as possible. The opposing forces con-
sisted of the same number of Sensors, Deciders, 
and Influencers, differing only in how they were 
arranged (i.e., linked). Within each force, the 
numbers of Sensors and lofluencers were equal 
to preclude any bias towards configurations that 
have more of one or the other, because the po-
tential value of a Sensor may not truly equal the 
potential value of an Influencer. Consequently, 
the composition of each force followed an X-Y-
X-1 (Sensor-Decider-Influencer-Target) template, 
with the sole target being representative of all the 
opposing nodes. Additionally, the performance 
capabilities of all Sensor and Influencer nodes 
within the agent-based simulation were identical 
(i.e., the sensing range equaled the influencing 
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range, and the speeds of movement for both types 
of nodes were the same). 
The goal of this experiment was to gain a "first 
order" understanding of the IACM, therefore two 
key scoping decisions were made. First, each 
Sensor and Influencer would only be connected 
to one Decider (but any given Decider could be 
connected to multiple Sensors and Influencers). 
Second, theconnectivitywithin any X-Y-X-1 force 
was limited to only those links necessary to create 
combat cycles (i.e., Target to Sensor, Sensor to 
Decider, Decider to Influencer, and Influencer to 
Target). Thesearetheessenceofthe).,PFE_ Whereas 
the other link types can significantly enhance both 
the "-PFE value and the performance of any given 
network configuration, the present model provides 
a baseline for assessing what the potential effects 
of that inclusion may be. 
There are many ways in which nodes can be 
connected for specific values of X and Y. The 
number of possible configurations grows rapidly 
even for small values. Consider a tiny network 
consisting of three Sensors and three Influencers 
distributed between two Deciders. There are only 
four different permutations of the allocation of 
these Sensors and Influencers between these De-
ciders. However, because the nodes of the IACM 
are generic two of these four permutations are, in 
effect, isomorphic and therefore can be excluded 
(i.e., the only meaningful difference between these 
two possible configurations is whether the Decider 
that is linked to two Sensors is the same Decider 
that is linked to two Influencers. While this 50% 
reduction in combinations to be considered is 
trivial for this tiny network, it quickly becomes 
a crucial step in reducing the search space of the 
problem. Considering a slightly larger force of 
just five Sensors and five Influencers allocated 
across three D eciders yields 36 different permuta-
tions which, fortunately, can be reduced to eight 
meaningfully different configurations by applying 
the same logic. 
As the size of the force is increased it is obvious 
that the contrast between the number of possible 
configurations and the number of meaningfully 
different configurations becomes extremely large 
very quick! y. This disparity is further compounded 
by the comprehensive design of the experiment, 
where each configuration was tested against every 
possible configuration. Since a 7-3-7- 1 network 
has 42 meaningfully different configurations this 
required 1,764 (i.e., 422) unique engagements. Had 
we not reduced the search space, we this would 
.have required 50,625 (Le., 2252) unique engage• 
ments. The numbers of meaningfully different 
configurations for all X·Y-X-1 forces wbereX < 
Table I . The numbers of meaningfully different configurations of all X-Y-X-1 networked forces where X 
< 11 and Y < 8 
2 1 ~b.~~IJJ~J'f:~;F/J~r ~;-..o .. fbrJ!.Jt~'~~r,!P' ~•JlfJ.if,!f,:,t~~ :;-:•i:.-~l~~ iiiJ~,-• effj: ~~ • 0 
9 2 1 ·-·,1H ''~iEi._fJ',"!k"'fr: ·i:l:X{~'i{ .• ~}if,~ 
27 9 2 1 
74 30 9 2 
168 95 31 9 
363 248 105 31 
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11 and Y < 8 based on the unique values for the 
distributions of Sensors and Influencers across 
the Deciders are summarized in Table 1. 
As previously mentioned, each of these con-
figurations bas a unique adjacency matrix that rep-
resents the connectivity, or lack thereof, between 
each of the nodes. If we segment the adjacency 
matrix into parts by grouping the types of nodes 
together (as depicted in FigureFigure 2), we see 
that 14 of the 16 sections (the shaded areas in 
the figure) are homogenous, i.e. either all "1" or 
"O," due to the absolute absence or existence of 
any links between those types of nodes. The two 
unshaded sections reflect the connectivity of each 
Sensor and Influencer to and from a particular 
Decider, and vary by configuration based on the 
allocation of Sensors and Influencers across the 
Deciders. The effect of this near uniformity is to 
constrain the variance between the \FE values to 
just a narrow portion of the full range of possible 
\.'E values. lo the example case of a 7-3-7-1 net-
work the full range of possible "'rrt: values varies 
between O (no connections) and 18 (maximally 
connected), but the actual range of A.P~E values 
for the 42 meaningfully different configurations 
varies from 1.821 to 2.280. 
Although the variation between the APFE values 
is small, it is of significant utility because the 
values of other common statistical measures as 
defined by Cares (2005) remain constant between 
these configurations. The 42 meaningfully dif-
ferent configurations of a 7-3-7-1 network all 
have a link-to-node ratio of 1.556, regardless of 
where the links are placed. The characteristic path 
length and clustering coefficients are also constant 
across every configuration. These metrics can 
provide valuable insight regarding large, complex 
networks, but cannot discriminate between near-
identical configurations of a smallernetwork, even 
Figure 2. An adjacency matrix for one of the 42 meaningfully different configurations of a 7-3-7-1 network 
e e u.: 
To 
l t t T 
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if the only link changed has a significant impact 
on the effectiveness of that network. 
Identical configurations of the same network 
always have the same 11,PFE value, but it is also 
possible for meaningfully different configurations 
to share the same "-PFE value. In our example, the 
42 meaningfully different configurations of a 
7-3-7-i networked force had only 13 unique "-PFE 
values. When this occurs, the 11,PFE loses its utility 
as an indicator of potential pe1formance between 
these configurations. Note that the numbers of 
unique APFE values (shown in Table 2 for all X-Y-
X-1 forces where X < 11 and Y < 8) increase at 
a significantly smaller rate than the numbers of 
meaningfully different combinations (shown in 
Table 1). This disparity has a significant impact 
on the analysis approach and results. 
The initial experiment consisted of all possible 
force-on-force engagements of the 42 meaning-
fully different configurations of two 7-3-7-1 
networked forces (BLUE and RED). These con-
figurations had the same numbers of assets but 
differed only in the way nodes were connected, 
which will enable us to study the impact of con-
nectivity on the network performance. To test the 
performance of 1;;ac!! of these 42 configurations 
against each other required 1,764 different en-
gagements were required with 30 replications of 
the agent-based simulation, each with a random 
distribution of the BLUE and RED nodes across 
the battlespace. The possible outcomes of each 
replicatioa was a BLUE win, a RED win, or an 
undecided result. 
The results showed that the greater the \,FE 
value for either BLUE or RED, the more likely 
that force would win the eogagement. This tread 
is clear in FigureFigure 3, where the probability 
of a BLUE win for any particular configuration 
is averaged over all RED configurations. Note 
that the vertical groupings reflect those BLUE 
configurations that shared each of the 13 unique 
11,PFE values. A linear regression model confirms 
the visual evidence with a coefficient of determi-
nation (R2) of 0.896 for the following equation: 
y = l.0162(x) - 1.5780, where y = the average 
probability of a BLUE win for that configuration 
and x = the 11,PFE value of a configuration. 
The correlation between p(Win) and the ~FE 
value remains true for the 8-3-8-1 force as well. 
Adding just the one Sensor and Influencer in-
creased the number of meaningful combinations 
to 78, with 24 unique 11,PFE values, with 6,084 dif-
ferent engagements to be tested (see FigureFigure 
4). This linear regression resulted in a coefficient 
Table 2. The numbers of unique ,lm: values for the meaningful configurations for all X-Y-X-1 forces 
where X < 11 and Y < 8 
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of determination (R2) equal to 0.876 for the fol-
lowing equation: Y = 0.9484(x) - 1.5633, where 
y = the average probability of a BLUE win for 
that configuration and x = the "PFE value of a 
configuration. 
The correlation between p(Win) and the \FE 
value decreased significru1tly for a 9-5-9-1 force, 
however. The additional Sensor, Influencer, and 
Decider nodes increased the nwnber of meaning-
fully different configurations to 95, and resulted in 
9,025 different engagements to be tested. Surpris-
ingly, the additional assets reduced the number 
of unique "PFE values to 13 (13.68%). Thls is a 
dramatic reduction from 30.77% (24 of 78) for 
the 8-3-8-1 force, and 30.95% (13 of 42) for the 
7-3-7-1 force. The impact of this reduction in 
unique APFE values is a greater variety of p(Win) 
across for each "PPE value (see FigureFigure 5); 
hence the reduction in R2 to a value of 0.519 for 
the resulting equation: Y = 0.5861(x) - 0.7736, 
where y = the average probability of a BLUE 
win for that configuration and x = the "-PPE value 
of a configuration. Note that the highest p(Win) 
value does not belong to the configuration with 
the higbestAPFE value, indicating that there is some 
other correlating factor in effect. 
The most significant difference between the 
configurations sharing a common "PFE value 
concerns the balance of Sensors and Influencers 
for each Decider within that configuration. This 
balance defines the "robustness" of the configura-
tion, which was a term used by Barabasi (2002) 
to describe a network's resilience to failure due 
to the loss of some of its nodes. Robustness can 
be defined here as the minimum number of nodes 
lost that would make the configuration ineffective 
(i.e., unable to destroy any more enemy nodes). 
Mathematically this can be expressed as: Robust-
ness = [min(S 1,I)] + [min(S2,12)] + ... + [min(S0 , 
I)], where S = the number of Sensors assigned 
n " 
to Decider n and I = the number of Influencers n 
assigned to Decider n. 











• 0.20 • 
0.10 
1.800 
• • • .. 






♦ • • • • • t • ,. .., 
♦ • 
2.000 2.100 2.200 2 .300 
BLUE PFE value 
183 
Improving C2 Effectiveness Based on Robust Connectivity 




• • • • t. t I • - 0.55 • . .., i •• , •• 
i ••• g: 0.45-r-----------.--------------c 
..., • ♦• 
~ ·•* 0.35 - ---·----,- · - - • ------ - - - ---- - ---· ·-- -- - -- -




1.800 1.900 2.000 2 100 2.200 2.300 2.400 2.500 
BLUE PFE value 
For example, a Decider bas three Sensors 
but only one Influencer. This imbalance reduces 
the minimum number of nodes that can be lost 
before a portion of the force is rendered combat 
ineffective (i.e., unable to contribute due to the 
lack of combat cycles). If the sole Influencer is 
lost, then all three Sensors are combat ineffective 
as t.he information collected by the Sensors can-
not be acted on. Essentially, the robustness value 
reflects the rate of the reduction of the A PFE value 
over time. The quicker a force can be rendered 
completely ineffective, the lower the robustness 
value. Configurations that were more robust 
generally had a greater probability of winning, 
while less robust configurations generally had a 
lower probability of winning (seeFigureFigure 6). 
Since the robustness value varied between 
configurations sharing the same APFE value it be-
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Figure 6. The robustness values of the 95 configurations of a 9-5-9-1 BLUE network 
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came a useful discriminator. For example, 20 of 
the 95 configurations of a 9-5-9-1 network share 
a "-PFE value of 2.031, but their robustness values 
varied between 6 and 9. Of these 20, only one 
configuration had a robustness value of 9, and it 
was the one that scored the highest p(Win) value, 
0.5425, which was significantly higher than the 
other 19 configurations. While there was a strong 
correlation between robustness and p(Win), it was 
not absolute: 3 of the configurations outperformed 
others that had a robustness value one greater. 
A regression analysis of both the "-PFE value and 
the robustness value yields a significant increase 
in the coefficient of determination (R2) from a 
value of 0.621 to 0.805 and provides the fo1low-
ing equation: y = [(-0.0307)(x1) + 0.0615(x..2)] 
+ 0.0678, where y = the average probability of 
a BLUE win for that configuration, x1 = the 11.PFE 
value of a configuration, and x2 = the robustness 
value of a configuration. 
APPLICATION FOR PRACTITIONERS 
Due to the high costs and high risk of real system 
tests, the use of modeling and simulation instead 
oflive tests and exercises has been recommended 
by Ender et al. (2010) and Garrett et al. (2011). 
Although the authors are not aware of any study 
on the efficiency of the ballistic missile defense 
system based on the principles of IACM, several 
studies have been provided that evaluate so called 
'kill chains' or 'kill cycles' that have to be estab-
lished in order to have efficient solutions (Hol-
land and Wallace 2011). This study establishes 
a good use case for the approaches discussed in 
this chapter. 
The challenges to design a reliable and secure 
defense system against ballistic missile attacks 
have been recognized and evaluated nationally 
(Fogleman 1995, Gompert and Isaacson 1999) 
as well as internationally (Yost I 982) for more 
tbana decade. Recent political changes introduced 
additional constraints that require a high degree 
of interoperability between the systems and the 
detailed integration of command and control 
processes (Fruhling and Sinjen 2010). 
The general technical challenge remained the 
same since described in detail by Weiner (1984). 
The overall task is to destroy a hostile ballistic 
missile before it hits the target to be protected. To 
be able to do this, radars and other sensor means 
have to search for threats and detect them. Once 
a hostile missile is detected, it needs to be tracked 
185 
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and a decision has to be made whether to target 
it or not. If the decision is positive, an intercep-
tor has to be launched and guided into the target, 
followed an assessment if the engagement was 
successful or not. 
Radar systems are space based, air based, and 
land based, with famous land based radar systems 
constructed close to the periphery of the alliance. 
The CobraDane Radar in Alaska, the Thu le Radar 
in Greenland, and the Fylingdales Radar in the 
United Kingdom being examples. The US com-
mand centers Strategic Command (STRA TCOM) 
and Northern Command (NORTHCOM) provide 
the Command, Control, Battle Management, and 
Commurucations (C2BMC) for the control. The 
interceptors are land-based Terminal High Altitude 
Area Defense (THAAD) Fire Units, sea-based 
Aegis Cruisers and Destroyers, and the land-
based Patriot systems. Europe, Israel, and Japan 
are contributing their own components to support 
local concepts. The Missile Defense Agency, 
Army, Air Force, and Navy share responsibilities 
for operation, management, maintenance, and 
ongoing developments. 
Holland and Wallace (2011) define a kill 
chain as a series combining all six main tasks 
to be conducted by the radar system, the control 
system, and the missile system. The proposed 
chain is displayed in Figure 7. 
As identified by Garrett et al. (2011), the bal-
listic missile defense system is actually a system 
of systems in which the various components them-
selves are systems with established governance 
rules and that support the common objective of 
missile defense, but that are operationally inde-
pendent. Overall, they fulfill the distinguishing 
characteristics compiled by Tolk, Adams, and 
Keating (2011): 
• Operational independence of the systems, 
• Managerial independence of the systems, 
• Geographic <listribution, 
• Emergent behavior, 
• Evolutionary development. 
To establish a kill chain, components providing 
radar functionality to search and detect, control 
functionality to track, target, and assess, and mis-
sile functionality to engage are required to be in-
terconnected via interoperable interfaces. Holland 
and Wallace (2011) identify scenario graphs to 
address what they refer to as integration readiness 
level: are the various components able to connect 
with each other in order to establish a kill chain, 
and are there redundancies to increase the stability 
of the ballistic missile defense operation. They 
use correspon<ling adjacency matrix.es to identify 
which radar system connects with which control 
systems and which missile system. 
This motivates, however, to map the ballistic 
missile defense components to the IACM com-
ponents, eventually adding some extensions as 
discussed before: The hostile ballistic missile is 
the target T, the sensor provides the radar func-
tionalities S, the decision nodes model the control 
functionalities, and the engaging interceptor mis-
sile system represents the influencer. The IACM 
interpretation of the kill chain is shown in the 
following figure. 
This interpretation allows to apply the IACM 
insights described before to evaluate effectiveness 
and efficiency of the ballistic missile defense 
system. If each likely attack must be met by at 
Figure 7. Kill Chain for the Ballistic Missile Defense System 
Control 
Target H E~gage H ~.~~~~ -1 
Control Missile Control 
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Figure 8. !ACM fnte,pretation of the kill chain 
least one kill chain. However, each additional kill 
chain increases the likelihood of a defense suc-
cess, and the more kill chains can cover a target, 
the higher the defense success gets. The number 
of possible kill chains, however, can be captured 
by computing the eigenvalue "PPE of the resulting 
adjacency matrix resulting from the interpretation 
of interoperable components within the IACM. 
The engagement step itself must also be in-
terpreted as a kill cycle within the IACM. An 
interceptor fire unit comprises its own command 
and control center (D), a fire control radar (S), 
and the interceptor missile (I) to engage a hostile 
ballistic missile (T). In particular in combined 
operations in which several nations are fighting 
within a coalition, mutual support - like easily 
possible between two Aegis cruisers or two Pa-
triot systems - is not the rule. The Israeli Arrow 
Weapon System, e.g., can be integrated into the 




ment cycle itself the fire unit components are not 
interchangeable, which is often a problem between 
services and sometimes even within the services 
as well. The kill cycle for the engagement step 
maps one-to-one to the basic combat cycle shown 
in FigureFigure 1 in the beginning of the chapter, 
although it should be pointed out that the tracking 
of the hostile ballistic missile by the fire control 
radar is a process, not an event. For high-level 
analysis as targeted within most contributions to 
this book, this level of detail is often negligible 
and it can be assumed that each fire unit can and 
will operate independently. Cross fire unit support 
can only increase the overall efficiency and has 
no negative effects on the overall performance of 
ballistic missile defense. 
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CONCLUSION 
As recommended in the NATO Code of Best 
Practice for C2 Assessment (2002), the use of 
an orchestrated set of tools and methods is best 
practice when addressing complex questions like 
this one. The benefit ofIACM based sceriarios is 
that they allow us to analyze a broad volume of 
the solution space to identify a smaller fraction 
of particular interest. This smaller area can then 
be evaluated using detailed simulation systems, 
such as described by Lynch, Diallo, and Tolle 
(2013), which is based on the concepts theoreti-
cally introduced by Garrett et al. (2011). 
The application of the IACM also shifts the 
focus of the assessment of a networked force from 
the capabilities of the nodes (generic in the IACM) 
to the capability of the network as a whole. The 
results of the agent-based simulation indicated that 
the value of the APFE was a significant measurement 
of the performance of a networked force. We also 
learned that the APFE value alone was insufficient 
indicator when the ratio of unique APffi values for 
the configurations under consideration decreased. 
Other quantifiable network rr.e!rics, such as the 
link-to-node ratio, degree distribution, clusted..il~ 
coefficient, and characteristic path length, were 
unable to consistently discriminate between these 
configurations that differed by a single link, regard-
less of the significance of that link. The addition 
of a robustness factor was necessary to aid in 
predicting the network performance. By utilizing 
both the "-PFE value and the robustness value, the 
coefficient of determination for the numerous 
configurations of three different networked forces 
showed a strong degree of correlation with the 
average probability of a Win. 
We expect that these results will apply to even 
larger networks as well given that the only differ-
ence in the context of the IACM is a larger, possibly 
much larger, adjacency matrix. The mathematics 
of the application of graph theory remain the same. 
It is possible, however, that larger networks may 
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have a smaller ratio of unique APFE values. If so, 
the consideration of the robustness factor along 
with the 11,PFE value becomes even more necessary. 
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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
BaUistic Missile Defense System: A system 
of operationally independent systems that support 
the common objective of missile defense. 
Command and Control (C2): The exercise of 
authority and direction by a properly designated 
commander over assigned and attached forces in 
the accomplishment of the mission. 
Information Age Combat Model (IACM): 
A model, proposed by Cares (2005), of search, 
detection and attrition processes that is specifi-
cally designed to capture complex local behaviors, 
interdependencies and the skewed distribution of 
networked performance. 
Kill Chain: A series of tasks that execute the 
following functions: search (sensor), detect (sen-
sor), track (decision), target (decision), engage 
(influencer) and assess (decision). 
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APPENDIX 
Questions 
1. What other connectivity measures for matrices could be applied? 
2. How will this observation change if connections are no longer sure (p=l .0) but only likely (0 < p 
< 1), e.g. when detection probabilities or communication probabilities are modeled in the IACM? 
3. Can Kill Chains as described for the BDMS example be expressed in form of matrices? 
4. Can we determine the value of a Sensor relative to an Influencer? 
5. How many assets can organizational optimization offset (i.e. a smaller, more optimally organized 
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